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Introduction
An antitrust infringement often results in harm via price effects 1 . This means that the cartel, or the dominant undertaking, fixes a supra-competitive price that it charges to its customers.
However, these buyers might not be the end consumers of those goods or services but rather a first juncture of a supply chain that can be more or less complex 2 . The direct purchaser therefore has a threefold choice. Firstly, she can internalise the overcharge and charge on her clients the same as before the infringement. Alternatively, she may pass on the full overcharge, raising prices by the same amount as the overcharge, burdening the indirect purchaser with the corresponding cost.
Finally, the direct purchaser can pass on only part of the overcharge, internalising the remainder of it.
To present an example, vitamin producer 'β' cartelises with competitors in order to fix higher prices for bulk vitamins. β sells the vitamins at a supra-competitive price to the cosmetics producer 'Ω'. This latter firm has a distributor, 'α', to whom it sells the cosmetic products.
Although the price of vitamins increased, due to the cartel, Ω might decide, perhaps for fear of losing an important client, to sell the cosmetics at the same price as before. In a different and, according to economic scholars 3 , more likely scenario, Ω decides to pass on the full price increase for vitamins or at least part of it to the next level of the supply chain, that is the cosmetics distributor α. The question posed in this regard is, therefore, if α is entitled to claim damages against the cartelist β and if the latter can oppose the passing-on defence to a claim raised by the direct purchaser Ω. The direct purchaser who passes on the overprice is a median between the antitrust infringer and the subject harmed by the infringement. Under the causal laws of both common law and civil law jurisdictions, if the action of the direct purchaser has an independent causal effect, it becomes the only cause of the damage and, therefore, 'breaks the causal chain' between the infringement and the harm to the indirect purchaser. 4 As a consequence, the indirect purchaser would be barred from claiming damages against the antitrust infringer for lack of causation.
The scenario is even more complicated if we think that in the downstream market, after the distributor, there may be a long chain of subjects buying, implementing or re-selling the vitamins and the other derived products. In addition, we should think of the market chain as a network of relationships, which springs both vertically and horizontally; and so does the damage that is transmitted through the price adaptations that follow a price shock 5 .
However, the passing-on is -at present -conceptualised as taking place only vertically, upstream or downstream in the supply chain. This is the approach adopted by the European Directive 2014/104, which allows both actions from indirect purchasers and the passing-on defence. In this view, the passing-on is due to trade relations that bind the production to the distribution process, so that what happens at a certain level of the supply chain tends to be passed on to the next level 6 . This raises questions of 'proximity' of the causal connection between the damage and the infringement, because at each step of the supply chain a new action will be implemented, resulting in an additional possibility to introduce an independent and sufficient cause of damage. In other words, it is not always clear when the overcharge passing through the supply chain dissipates and stops being a cause of damages and when, instead, it remains an adequate causal link of the damage. The same applies to upward connections in the supply chain, as, for instance, a buying cartel may yield similar effects.
This paper analyses the passing-on in light of causation laws. Once the general problem around the proof of causation in passing-on actions is described, it presents the choices made by national judges and legislators in the four countries selected for the comparative study 7 . Therefore, the third part describes the approach adopted by the recently released Directive on competition law damages actions 8 . With regard to the Directive, this paper argues that the legislator has been sufficiently precise in identifying the problems and fixing the aims, but has not been as efficient in proposing solutions. Part V analyses indeed the solutions laid down by the Directive in light of the aims posed by the same European legislator. In particular, this paper observes that the presumptions contained in the Directive may ease the burden of proof for the indirect purchaser claiming damages, but yield the opposite effect of discouraging damages actions. Consumers generally lack sufficient economic incentive to bring the lawsuit. In addition to that, they also lack efficient procedural rules that may facilitate such claims, especially through collective actions.
Moreover, the take of this paper is that the structure of the supply chain relationships influences price transmission, as well as other factors. These include the bilateral relationships between buyer and seller. Therefore, the simplification of the vertical pass-through of the overcharge may lead to unequal treatment of market actors that were equally harmed by the competition law infringement. The private enforcement of European competition law is centred on the aim of compensating the victim of an antitrust infringement ('the compensatory principle') 9 . This is one of the main differences to the US system, that heavily relies on the deterrence effect of private antitrust provisions 10 . The compensatory principle dispenses a general rule that is aimed to enable the harmed party to recover damages in order to restore the same situation, at least from an economic point of view, as before the breach occurred 11 . For obtaining compensation of the damage, the claimant has to substantiate the infringement, the prejudice suffered and the causal connection between the two.
Passing-on as a matter of causation
Antitrust infringements usually affect several subjects at the same time, because they have a horizontal impact on the direct buyers of those goods and a vertical impact on down-and upstream markets connected to them 12 . The supply chain that brings the good from the first supplier to the consumer can be more or less complex and is generally composed of different links, which correspond to an equal number of steps before the final consumer. Among other factors, the complexity of these chains therefore depends on how many levels the product undergoes before 26 The causal contribution of market actors may be interpreted in the light of quantitative or scalar approaches to causation, which allow the evaluation of the multiple causes of the damage apportioning the damage on the basis of the causal contribution, although this is not subject of scrutiny of the present paper. See Jane Stapleton, 'Two Explosive Proof-of-Causation Doctrines Central to Asbestos Claims, The' (2008) 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1011; Moore (n 24). 27 The damage unlawfully inflicted to the property of another. assessment of foreseeability, both subjective and objective, that is an analytic element placed at the second stage of the reconstruction of the causal nexus.
The specific questions related to material causation are different and specifically related to the factual situation. On this basis, a general subdivision of causality questions can be framed as follows. The material causation demands that the claimant (indirect purchaser) gives sufficient proof that the cartel overcharge was passed on to her. So the question would then be whether or not the damage would have happened but for the antitrust infringement 28 . On the other hand, the defendant (the antitrust infringer) has to prove that the steps taken after the first purchase reduced or eliminated the damage. When instead the direct purchaser is to claim for damages, the evidential burden related to causation varies according to the specific characteristics of the domestic system.
In competition law the but-for approach is often developed through counterfactuals 29 .
When the overcharge is the result of an antitrust infringement that inflates the prices of goods or services, the legislator has to decide whether to allow indirect purchasers to claim compensation for the relative damages or not. At this point, the material causal link between the conduct and the event finds correspondents in each antecedent (near, intermediate and remote) that has generated, or even contributed to this objective relation to the fact, and therefore should be considered a cause of the event. The second stage requires instead the analysis of legal causation in order to ascertain that the damage claimed falls foul of competition regulation and therein is attributable to the antitrust infringer.
Legal causation
28 Differently and, in a more sophisticated way, the judge can ask whether the overcharge passed-on was a necessary element of a set of conditions jointly sufficient for causing the damage claimed. For an analysis of the NESS theory and its application in tort law see supra, para 2.6; Wright, 'Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof' (n 24); Hart and Honoré The illegal overcharge passed through the market chain may cause different types of damages to both direct and indirect purchasers. Firstly, there is the actual loss of the purchaser who did not pass on the overcharge, which amounts to the level of the overcharge multiplied by the number of items purchased 30 . As for intermediate buyers of the goods or services under infringement, when they succeed to pass on the overcharge paid, they can claim for lost profits caused by the decline in demand due to higher prices 31 . However, the pass on of the overcharge may cause other types of damages. For instance, the raise in prices by the cartel may generate umbrella effects 32 , or may bring a counterfactual purchaser to renounce the purchase.
The evaluation of legal causation -both in terms of the dependence of the event on its factual antecedents and with regard to the scope of the rule infringed -is done according to criteria of scientific probability or relying on logic inferences 33 determined by domestic tort laws. Legal causation delimits the compensation, identifying which damages are ruled out from the compensation to the claimant materially injured by the infringement. Some of the principles developed by European jurisdictions to assess legal causation are remoteness, directness, scope of the rule, causal regularity, probability 34 . Hence, based on these or any other tests adopted by the domestic law of a Member State, the claimant has to substantiate that the supra-competitive price caused damages that are causally linked to the antitrust infringement and meet the legal . 33 Hart and Honoré (n 4) 85 ff. 34 For an analysis of some national European approaches to the legal causation, see here chapter III. 35 Therefore, for instance, the claimant will have to prove, depending on the applicable law, that the damage is direct, falls within the scope of the rule, is a regular consequence, is probable, or is not remote. Moreover, the CJEU has more recently required the national tax authority to prove also the unjust enrichment of the claimant in case of compensation 42 . The CJEU deemed it necessary because, even in case of passing-on of the charge levied, the claimant may suffer a reduction of its sales due to the price increase, resulting in a loss of profits 43 .
Non-contractual liability
In Ireks-Arkady 44 a quellmehl producer claimed for compensation of the damages caused by the European Community that rejected his application to receive the subsidies. The quellmehl is used in bread production and is derived from maize or wheat. The point made by the claimant was that the quellmehl is used as an alternative to starch, therefore the European institutions were supposed to recognise the subsidy under the parity of treatment clause. At the time of the claim the European Commission already stated that quellmehl producers had to be levelled with the starch producers. Ireks decided to claim for the prior damages felt. The Commission opposed that the claimant had passed the damage through the supply chain. In response, the claimant objected that he could not raise prices, given the competition of starch producers who were benefitting from subsidies in the same relevant period.
The CJEU admitted in general terms the possibility to invoke the passing-on defence.
However, in the specific case, it rejected the objection of the defendant because there was no sufficient proof of the passing-on.
In the following Wührer case 45 , the Court faced a double defence by the Commission and the Council based on passing-on exceptions. This case regards the same line of refunds to maize producers as in the Ireks-Arkady case. Differently from Ireks, the Italian brewery Wührer was not a maize producer. However, it purchased the maize directly from the producers and used it for the production of beer. The same producers assigned their right to the production refund to Wührer.
On this point, the Commission and the Council raised two objections. With the first objection, they maintained that Wührer had passed on the damage through price overcharges on the final products 42 Secondly, the Commission and the Council objected that Wührer was an 'indirect assignee' of the right to production refund. Hence, the claimant had to substantiate the consideration paid for having that right. On this ground, the Court stated that the Commission erred to qualify the relationship between Wührer and the right to compensation. The claimant was indeed the assignee of those rights, which were legally transferred to him by the owner. By consequence, Wührer was not claiming for a refund passed on by the producers. The claimant was, indeed, the direct owner of the right to refund 47 .
C-192/95 -Comateb and Others v Directeur général des douanes and droits indirects ECR I-
Passing-on in national courts: a comparative overview in competition law
National courts have long been dealing with the passing-on of price overcharges in competition damages actions, preceding in time the choices made with the Damages Directive.
Generally, national courts have accepted passing-on considerations, granting indirect purchasers the right to claim damages and ensuring, at the same time, the defendants's right to exercise the passing-on defence. However, the degree and extent of these rights are slightly different in modulation.
Germany
The German Act In a later case, related to the carbonless paper cartel (the 'ORWI' case), the Federal Court of Justice finally granted the indirect purchaser the right to stand and, at the same time, allowed the direct purchaser to raise the passing-on defence 55 . The proceeding involved three parties, a savings Bank (claimant), a printing firm (injured party) and the cartelist (defendant), a carbonless paper producer.
The damaged party, an insolvent printing firm, transferred its own right to compensation to the savings bank through an assignment of claims. wholesaler of the defendant at inflated prices. By consequence, when it learned about the existence of the cartel, it claimed for compensation of the damages due to the price overcharge.
The Court of first instance (District Court of Mannheim) dismissed the claim, stating that only direct purchasers of cartel members had the right to claim compensation 57 . Moreover, the judge of the merit clung to the motivation observing that the claimant, by its turn, might have passed the overcharge on to their clients. The claimant appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeal of Karlsruhe, which, however, endorsed the position of the first grade judge with regard to the passing-on issue 58 . The Appellate Court, however, found that in the specific case the claimant was entitled to claim for damages. The claimant purchased the paper from a wholesaler, who was fully owned by the cartelist. On this basis the judge reasoned that, since the direct purchaser, it being a subsidiary, would have never recovered the damage against the parent company, the judge had to grant the indirect purchaser the right to claim compensation, in order to avoid unjust enrichment of the cartelist 59 .
On the other hand, both courts agreed that the passing-on defence should not be likewise allowed. For, in that case, the cartel member would be exempted from any sort of compensatory liability. By consequence, the Appellate Court granted the defendant the damages, calculating only the sales from the wholly owned subsidiary of the cartel member and excluded the passing-on exception, by denying any possible reduction of damages based on eventual pass-on of the overcharge.
By contrast, and finally, the Supreme Court held that also indirect purchasers should be able to bring damages claims against the members of a cartel 60 . In addition, the Court determined the admissibility of the passing-on defence, so dismissing the argument of the Court of Appeal 61 .
As a result, the Supreme Court stated that every damaged party is entitled to claim compensatory damages from any of the antitrust infringers 62 . By consequence, each cartelist is jointly and severally liable for the whole damage caused to a purchaser, be it direct or indirect. On the other hand, the defendant has the right to object the fact that the direct purchaser had passed the damage through the market chain. The Court moreover reasserts the power of the trial judge to estimate damages caused by a cartel 63 . The Court also bases its interpretation on Section 33(3), sentence 2 ARC (even though it was not applicable to the case at hand) making it more difficult to object the passing-on defence. The defendant can invoke the passing-on defence pleading an adjustment of profits. In order to do this, the defendant has to substantiate the simultaneous fulfilment of three conditions. Firstly, the defendant has to support with plausible proof or evidence that the passingon was economically possible. Secondly, he has to show that there was a causal link between the infringement and the damage passed on. Finally, the defendant's burden of proof also compels him to give evidence for the fact that no other economic disadvantages injured the direct purchaser. In particular, the Court refers to the loss of profit resulting from the decrease in demand that is a normal market response to the increase in prices.
The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) made clear that the burden of proof of the passing-on of the overcharge lies with the defendant. Therefore, when the direct purchaser claims compensation from the antitrust infringer, it is up to the cartelist to show evidence of the passing-on. On this point, commentators already noticed that the proof in many cases can become a 'probatio diabolica', given that access to information needed to substantiate the passing-on can be particularly thorny 64 . Some scholars pointed out that the obstacle could be overcome by courts accepting the so-called 'secondary burden of allegation' 65 . This is a special procedural instrument used in some jurisdictions to oblige claimants to disclose the relevant information for providing rebuttal evidence 66 . Hence, the claimant has to demonstrate and to prove that his damage is based on the prohibited cartel. If the victim did not purchase directly from the cartel members, he must also prove that the overcharge was passed on to him as an indirect purchaser. Given the complexity of pricing, the BGH held that there is no presumption that an increase in prices during the period 63 ibid. The estimation has to be conducted within the specific framework that the Supreme Court draws. Firstly, the judge has to base the estimation on the prices of goods actually paid by the claimant. Secondly, the prices can be adjusted by decreasing or increasing factors. Finally, there are lingering effects that the judge can use in taking the decision for adapting the rule to the specific case. 64 66 Although, at the moment, the burden of proof of the claimant appears to be rather heavy, it seems to be that the possibility of actions from indirect purchasers are rare, given the difficulties related to substantiating the claim and that the German procedural law does not give the possibility of using class actions.
of cartelization results from such a cartel. In contrast to the EU Commission, the BGH demands evidence in every individual case. Although the Cassation concluded that indirect purchasers are allowed to bring claims directly against cartelists, the decision has been criticised for taking a rather defensive approach with regard to the pass on of the cartel overcharge 74 .
In a following case 75 , the French Supreme Court also specified that, as a matter of usual market dynamics, there is a presumption that purchasers tend to pass on the price overcharge paid for the good or service. Hence, the claimant has the burden to prove that she internalized the damage and avoided to pass the overcharge on to the next level of the market chain.
In both cases, the Court ruled that the claimant has the burden to substantiate the claim and also to prove that they internalised the overcharge, avoiding the passing-on of it .
The Commercial Court of Nanterre, in 2006, adopted a similar approach 76 that, however, has brought the judge to draw different conclusions. In this case, the judge burdened the plaintiff to prove why she could not have passed on the price increase to consumers. The court based its decision on the Commission's decision on the vitamins' cartel, presuming that price increases were likely to be passed on to consumers 77 . Ultimately, the court held that the cartel was implemented worldwide and, consequently, every competitor of the plaintiff was subject to the same conditions. Therefore, the plaintiff had the possibility of passing on the increase and the choice not to do so 72 This ruling clearly admits that indirect purchasers have standing under French law to bring a damages action against a competition law infringer. Not only is this ruling in line with the recommendations of the Commission in the White Paper, but it also complies with the ruling rendered on Following, in Cooper Tire, the parties settled the case and agreed that the availability of the passing-on defence should depend on normal English principles of causation and mitigation 84 .
The ostensible reluctance to treat the problem of passing-on in-depth might be explained by the factual approach that English judges have with regard to the pass-on issue. As explained by 85 . Hence, the court should adopt a case-by-case approach, verifying whether the cartel "has caused the benefit" or "provided the occasion or context for the innocent party to obtain the benefit", and it is part of the claimant's burden of proof to demonstrate how the cartel influenced prices.
However, as a matter of principle, the English system is in line with the other European jurisdictions that accept both claims from indirect purchasers and the defence of passing-on.
Meanwhile in the United States the Supreme Court, with the Hanover Shoe 86 and Illinois Brick 87 cases, rejected the defence of passing-on and barred indirect purchaser claims under federal antitrust law 88 . Defendants are not allowed to invoke the defence of passing-on against the claims of direct purchasers, and indirect purchasers cannot claim damages on the basis that an overcharge has been passed on to them 89 .
These two opposite views show dogmatic, legal and economic differences that are worth analysing but their enforcement is mainly based on considerations connected to the specific legal, economic and geographical drawbacks. The US approach, however, is deeply complicated by the fact that State courts have generally disregarded this case law. In many states the indirect purchaser has the right to claim antitrust damages and the antitrust infringer can use the passing-on argument as a defence. It is reported that "thirty-six states and the District of Columbia, representing over 70 percent of the nation's population, now provide for some sort of right of action on behalf of some or all indirect purchasers" 90 . This situation has generated paradoxical litigation where indirect purchasers are claiming for damages before state courts and direct purchasers sue the infringers before the federal courts.
The regulatory framework for passing-on in Europe
The choice of the EU Commission, expounded in the White Paper 2008 and clinched with the Directive 104/2014, has been to grant indirect purchasers the right to claim damages due to the passing-on of the overcharge and, simultaneously, to allow cartelists to oppose the passing-on defence. This choice is justified by the aim of ensuring the effective exercise of the victims' right to full compensation. However, the actual formulation of the Directive is the result of a process that counts at least ten years of different drafts. During the same period of time, the priorities of the European legislator changed and with them also the formulation of the relative rules on the passing-on, some of which were complicated by cryptic formulation 91 . In the following two paragraphs a critical description of this evolution is outlined.
The Green Paper and the White Paper
In the Green Therefore, the Commission proposed to make available both a passing-on defence for the defendant and the right for the indirect purchaser to claim for damages connected to the cartel. Regarding the standard of proof, the White Paper also pointed out that for the defendant it should not be lower than the burden imposed on the claimant to prove the damage. Instead, for indirect purchasers the Commission suggested the integration of the normative text with a rebuttable presumption that the illegal overcharge was passed on to them 99 .
The Directive Proposal and its amendments
In the wake of the mentioned CJEU case law and the White Paper, the Draft Directive 100 stated that injured parties are entitled to compensation for actual loss (overcharge harm) and loss of profit. The direct purchaser who passes on the overcharge, is entitled -therefore -to claim for the loss of profit due to the reduction of the volume sold consequent to the increase of price
101
. 101 The total harm suffered by the direct purchaser will amount therefore to the price of the overcharge minus the passing-on of the overcharge plus the damage from lost sales that result from the pass-on.
situation -before neglected -that the pass-on can take place also in an upwards direction on the supply chain (for instance in cases of buying cartels) 102 .
With Article 12 the Commission has then introduced the main innovation to the previous This article has been fundamentally changed by the General Approach that stated more simply that the defendant in an action for damages can invoke the fact that the claimant passed on the whole or part of the overcharge resulting from the infringement. Moreover, it provided that the burden of proving that the overcharge was passed on rests with the defendant.
The following Article 13 determined that the passing-on of the overcharge is presumed if the infringement is proven. On the other hand, the defendant is entitled to provide proof that the overcharge has not been passed on or has only partially been passed on to the indirect purchaser.
The 'Damages Directive'
Finally, on 26 November 2014, the Directive 2014/104 103 on antitrust damages actions was approved and, with it, the load of amendments it brought.
With this Directive, the EU legislator intended to ensure effective application of the compensatory principle enshrined in the Manfredi 104 and Courage 105 landmark cases. In order to do this, the Commission proposed, firstly, to deny that the application of the right to compensation could lead to multiple compensation and artificial multiplication of lawsuits, and secondly, to avoid unjust enrichment of the claimant who actually passed on the overcharge 106 . By consequence, the Commission proposed to introduce the passing-on both as a 'sword' and as a 'shield' in the EU legislation, in order to make it applicable in the whole EU area. In follow-on actions, the first condition is automatically fulfilled thanks to the disposal of Article 9 regarding the validity of the national competition authorities' decisions 116 . Moreover, the second requisite is also satisfied in case of cartels. Article 17.2 states that it shall be presumed that cartel infringements cause harm, in particular via price effects 117 , and the infringer shall have the right to rebut that presumption.
Finally, the injured party needs to substantiate the purchase of a good or service that was subject to the infringement, or that derived from it or, finally, that contains the goods or services subject to the infringement. The broad formulation of the third condition placed by Article 14.2 also simplifies the burden of proof of the claimant but creates interpretative issues. What does the norm mean by "goods or services derived from or containing the goods or services that were the subject of the infringement"? This is open to question.
Let us create an example. The international law firm 'X' purchases a number of printers from the undertaking 'Y'. After few years, it is discovered that the seller took part in a printers' cartel. In the meanwhile, the law firm decides to raise its fees. Are the clients of the law firm entitled to claim compensation as indirect purchasers? Can we say that the service offered by the law firm is derived by the use of the printers and therefore its costs also reflect the cartel overcharge?
In favour of a positive response stands the consideration that the operating costs of the law firm increased in the relevant period. In this case, relying on the actual formulation of the Directive, the clients of the advising company should be able to claim damages against the cartelists, since they purchased a service from a direct purchaser and they also paid an overcharge due to the price increase. Their advisor, indeed, included -allegedly and presumably -an overcharge caused by the price increase, in which the cartel overcharge is embedded. However, this simple assertion is too feeble to prove causation. Indeed, the legal service is not directly derived from the printing devices. And also from a cost analysis perspective, the price overcharge of the printers weighs on the cost of the service only to a very limited extent. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the cost increase is contained in one of the service fees 118 .
This reasoning can be extended to all cases where the good or service passed through the supply chain is somehow related but not yet part of the good or service subject to the infringement.
Otherwise, we should admit damages actions from any indirect purchaser related to any of the goods or services of subjects that purchased cartel products. The link of causation would be definitely lost as well as the function of the antitrust compensation being distorted. However, limiting the compensation to those market actors that purchased goods derived from the ones subject to infringement, may bring substantial inequalities in treatment. The identification of the damage into a token-overcharge, which can be passed on only vertically, fails to show that price changes are transmitted throughout the supply chain, rippling both horizontally and vertically. In other words, the victim of the antitrust infringement, rather than simply passing on the overcharge to the next stage, generally adapts prices of goods and services that she sells or buys, depending on the market and on the bargaining power she can exert in that specific market.
The right to compensation of the indirect purchasers finds a counterbalance in Article 13, which allows the passing-on defence. Thanks to this clause, the defendant can oppose against the claimant that he passed on all or at least a part of the overcharge resulting from the infringement of competition law. The burden of proof for passing-on remains on the defendant, who may reasonably require disclosure from the claimant or from third parties.
The direct purchaser who passed on all or a part of the overcharge maintains, in any case, the possibility to obtain compensation for lost profits 119 . Since it is embedded as acting commercial pattern, the pass-on is more likely to happen than not, at least for the law.
How passing-on works in the
Hence, the Directive prefers to presume the pass-on to have happened with the indirect purchaser being able to show prima facie evidence.
The second paragraph of the same Article 14 explains how the indirect purchaser can benefit from the pass-on presumption, which hinges on three conditions 122 . The reason for this rule though, many other issues gained importance in antitrust litigation and some others have been naturally digested and harmonised by the member states' systems, through case law and legislative adaptations.
Conclusion
Analysing the passing-on of a price overcharge relates to causation as the overcharge imposed by the infringer may be transmitted through the market chain, causing a series of damages that are not necessarily compensable due to the causal principles adopted by the domestic law of Member States. European national tort laws are generally based on corrective justice systems and therefore pursue the compensatory principle, in line with the present approach of European competition law. However, the way this objective is pursued by domestic laws often differs. In particular, the analysis of causation in competition damages actions is based on very diverse sets of principles, which are deeply rooted in the domestic legal systems 156 . In line with this, the Directive has opted for a formulation of the provisions that leaves enough room for national judges to apply the domestic principles of civil responsibility and causation. However, the Directive fails to clarify what types of damages are compensable under the passing-on provisions. The harm, in form of actual loss and lost profits, caused by the pass-through of the overcharge may affect a number of different subjects along the chain, including, for instance, counterfactual purchasers 157 , buyers harmed by umbrella prices and buyers harmed by 'waterbed effects'. The statement that only the indirect buyer who has purchased "the goods or services that were the object of the infringement of competition law, or has purchased goods or services derived from or containing them" 158 has standing for the damages action does not give enough clarity. Firstly, the meaning of goods and services "derived from or containing" as applied to certain types of goods and services subject to infringement is questionable and subject to interpretation . The mutability of many goods and services -combined with their almost immediate worldwide diffusion on global marketsopens a plethora of options of compensable subjects and types of damages. Secondly, the passage of the price overcharge from one level to the following may create diverse damaging effects at each level, which are not covered by the Directive. Thirdly, the lost profits, allowed but almost 156 See Cees van Dam, European Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 2013), 307-345. 157 As the Directive specifically addresses actual buyers, the counterfactual purchase would refer exclusively to the possible part of the goods that the harmed claimant would have purchased but-for the infringement. 158 Article 14 (c).
neglected by the Directive, may account for a substantial part of the damages claims, taking into consideration that the volume effect may, in some cases, even offset the actual loss, due to the overcharge 159 . Moreover, direct purchasers, who generally have more interests in claiming damages and who will most likely do so, will hardly obtain the compensation of the actual loss due to the passing-on defence, and therefore will seek damages for lost profits caused by the price rise. However, the claim for lost profits remains almost completely regulated by domestic laws, provided that the principles of equivalence 160 and effectiveness 161 of EU law 162 are complied with.
The Directive also operated heavily on the evidential burden of the passing-on, with the aim of facilitating the action for damages of indirect purchasers, through the adoption of a set of presumptions that will probably yield opposite effects. The presumption of passing-on is logically and structurally framed to prevail, bringing the overcharge damage down through the market chain.
But market actors operating at this level, chiefly consumers, have had little if no participation in the private enforcement of competition law and the situation will hardly improve since the Directive gives no incentives to these classes of subjects to claim damages, in particular neglecting any specific initiative on collective redress. The risk would therefore be to have a large extent of overcharge damages left uncompensated.
Despite the initial aim of the Proposal Directive of creating a 'level playing field' for all undertakings operating in the internal market 163 , the Damages Directive has opted for the constitution of a general framework where domestic laws will find application. In this regard, the passing-on of the overcharge is no exception, notwithstanding the detailed rules that the Directive laid down in this regard. European judges have no possibility to question the right to stand of indirect purchasers and the exercise of the passing-on defence by cartelists. At the same time, the presumptions of passing-on and of harm produced by cartels will find application. However, the counterproductive effects, the national judges will apply the domestic principles of factual and legal causation to solve such cases, eventually referring to the European Court of Justice.
